Policy Briefs

Ethiopia, being landlocked, considers reliable and cost-effective seaport access crucial for its economic development. Studies reveal that landlocked countries tend to be 20% less developed than they would be if they had access to the sea, partly due to higher transportation costs ranging from 50 to 260% more than coastal countries. To achieve its development objectives, Ethiopia requires “export-oriented” industrialization and increased agricultural productivity (The Ethiopian Herald, 2024). Historically, Ethiopia has relied on neighboring countries for sea access, especially since Eritrea’s secession in 1993, which cut off its primary maritime outlet. Ethiopia has since secured bilateral agreements, notably with Djibouti through the Djibouti Port Utilization Agreement. This agreement grants Ethiopia permanent rights to access the sea, use port facilities, and transit goods through Djibouti’s territory. Key provisions include exemptions from customs duties and the right for Ethiopian enterprises to operate in Djibouti’s duty-free zone. Disputes under this agreement can be settled through arbitration (Shchukina, 2024). This agreement exemplifies a successful bilateral approach that respects international norms and mutual sovereignty. In addition to the Djibouti port, Ethiopian access options include Kenya’s Moyale dry port and Somal’s Berbera port, though these routes currently lack the necessary infrastructure to support bulk shipments. Ethiopia’s need for cost-effective port access has led to aggressive diversification initiatives, resulting in an increasing number of sea and dry ports utilized by the country (The Ethiopian Herald, 2024). These efforts highlight Ethiopia’s strategic goal to mitigate dependency on a single-entry point and enhance logistical resilience. As part of Ethiopia’s efforts to expand its access to ports, it signed a port pact with Somalia in June 2018 and announced plans to jointly develop four Somali ports as part of a wider bilateral agreement to enhance political and economic cooperation. This agreement reflected Ethiopia’s regional push to warm relations with its neighbors, diversify port access, and secure its economic future (Oxford Analytica, 2018). However, Ethiopia’s recent agreement with Somaliland represents a significant shift from its previous diplomatic and strategic approaches. On January 1, 2024, Ethiopia signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the self-proclaimed Republic of Somaliland.  The full text of the agreement remains undisclosed to public, Somaliland announced an agreement to lease land to Ethiopia for 50 years for the construction of a naval facility along its coast, in exchange for Ethiopia’s recognition of Somaliland’s statehood. Yet, ambiguity persists regarding the agreement’s specifics, including the extent of the leased area and supplementary provisions. Initially, Ethiopian authorities hinted at a multifaceted purpose for the proposed facility, encompassing both military and commercial functions. Conversely, Somaliland asserted that Ethiopia’s intent revolves solely around establishing a naval base, with Berbera port retained for trade operations. Regarding the area, the initial announcement indicated a 20-kilometre stretch of coastline for lease. But later, a prominent Ethiopian figure stated the deal’s coverage spans 20 square kilometres of both land and sea (Šturdík, S. (2024). While Ethiopia’s pursuit of diversified port access is driven by legitimate economic and strategic interests, the method of bypassing recognized international protocols and engaging with an unrecognized entity like Somaliland raises critical legal and geopolitical issues. The move could lead to significant diplomatic and regional repercussions, challenging the established norms of international law and state sovereignty. Consequently, this move has been widely criticized by the international community, with countries and organizations like China, the United States, the African Union, and the European Union expressing support for Somalia’s territorial integrity. Somalia, which considers Somaliland part of its territory, condemned the agreement as an act of aggression and referred the dispute to the UN Security Council (Shchukina, 2024). With Turkey mediating talks between Somalia and Ethiopia regarding the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), both parties have expressed a willingness to engage in continued dialogue, despite not yet reaching an agreement. This policy brief paper aims to explore the motivations, legal implications, and geopolitical ramifications of Ethiopia’s efforts to secure diversified seaport access through Somaliland. It provides a comprehensive analysis of the Ethiopian-Somaliland Agreement, examining its impact on regional stability, international law, and Somalia’s sovereignty concerns. Additionally, the paper proposes viable conflict resolution models to facilitate a mutually beneficial solution for Somalia and Ethiopia.

The archetypical stable autonomous Federal Member State of Puntland is undergoing the most turbulent and uncertain time in its political history.  Since its foundation in 1998, the State has grappled with near political crisis at the end of every presidential tenure. The political wrangling over the term limits and electoral models between the incumbent president maneuvering to remain in power and the opposition candidates vying for the highest office of the State brings the State closer to crisis.  Although the State has never transitioned to democratic system of elections, it succeeded in peaceful selection of members of the House of the People, holding presidential elections and transfer of power every five years on 8th of January in the last 15 years.  This year election year 2023 has been different in many ways. The State has successfully conducted one person one vote local elections in 33 districts for the first time since it was founded.  But the year has also seen the worst intra-state election-related conflict, political disagreement and polarization. The current electoral conflict stems from unresolved issues that originated from the district council elections held on May 25, 2023, in 30 districts. Notably, three districts in Nugal, including the capital Garowe, experienced opposition boycotts leading to the non-participation of approximately 80,000 voters. This conflicts, compounded by amendments to constitutional articles, escalated into violent clashes in Garowe in June 2023. The resulting tensions have now permeated the ongoing parliamentary and presidential elections, given that the current president’s term is scheduled to conclude on January 8, 2024. The incumbent president and opposition groups find themselves in a deadlock, unable to reach a consensus on the electoral processes. The political landscape is marked by a clash of interests as both sides navigate the complexities of this electoral challenge. President Said Abdullahi Deni is attempting to achieve what no previous Puntland leader has accomplished: securing a second term in office. However, he encounters formidable opposition from a diverse group of politicians who despite their differences, share a common objective – preventing his re-election. Opposition forum believe that the president’s potential re-election hinges on a “one-sided election,” marked by manipulation, and a lack of fairness and transparency, that will result in a predetermined outcome that fails to genuinely represent the will of Puntland’s voters. The opposition forum cited the recently established Puntland Election Commission (PEC) as an example on how the president intends to undermine his term limit in office and manipulate the outcome of the election. The president and his allies argue that the government has a mandate to complete the transition to democracy and that the State is ready for one person one vote elections. The cite the recent local elections as a proof of the concept and  vow that there will be no return to the old, discredited, traditional elder’s selection of 66 member House of the People  and their subsequent election of the president. On November 2, 2023, 28 Puntland traditional leaders gathered in Garowe and issued a statement insisting that the scheduled January 8, 2024, election should not be postponed (Puntland Mirror, 2023). They proposed a return to the traditional selection model of the 66 parliamentary members due to time limitations. Additionally, they urged the parliament to promptly release the election annex and appoint a committee for dispute resolution. This declaration coincided with the Council of Ministers’ prior approval of the new Puntland election schedule, as announced by the Puntland Election Commission on November 24, 2023. Despite the president’s rejection of the elders’ decision, asserting that the matter of elections falls within the purview of the Puntland Election Commission and not the elders’ mandate, the opposition welcomed the traditional leaders’ stance. They perceived it as the only viable solution to the current impasse, highlighting the depth of the political deadlock and the urgency for alternative approaches to move forward. Tensions between the opposition and the president escalated when the opposition released a parallel electoral timetable on November 14, 2023, to implement the traditional elders’ decision for the upcoming elections in Puntland (Garowe Online, 2023). This timetable differs from the one issued by the Puntland Electoral Commission (PEC). According to the opposition’s timetable, Puntland will hold presidential elections on January 8. However, PEC’s timetable shows the elections taking place on February 25, 2024. In an effort to ease rising tensions, President Said Abdullahi Deni, on November 17, 2023, addressed a gathering during his visit to Ano-Yaskax village in the Nugal region (Garowe Online, 2023). He expressed a willingness to enter into discussions with opposition politicians to address the ongoing election dispute. However, he made it clear that there is a condition for these talks: the electoral process must strictly adhere to the principle of “one person, one vote,” a stance endorsed by his government. While the opposition has welcomed the president’s call for dialogue, they have stipulated a prerequisite of involving an impartial third party. They emphasized that the electoral process should be collectively agreed upon by all parties involved and must proceed as scheduled on January 8, 2024. Alarmed by the continued mobilization of forces by the government and some opposition groups, International Partners and Puntland Non-State Actors (PUNSAA) have been calling for de-escalation of tension and engaging in negotiations to reach a consensus-based electoral model. On November 21, 2023, International partners called on all parties to remain calm and exercise restraint, resolving their disputes through peaceful means, after expressing concerns about the risk of higher tensions, including the ongoing mobilization of forces (UNSOM, 2023). PUNSAA issued a statement urging all parties to negotiate and reach a consensus-based electoral model. In this context, this report provides a thorough analysis of the positions and perspectives of key political stakeholders, including the ruling party and its coalition parties, opposition forum, traditional elders, and civil society organizations. Amidst a heated election context, divergent views and approaches are explored, emphasizing the need for inclusive dialogue to address the impasse and ensure a peaceful and credible electoral process.

The use of the Somali sovereign currency (the Somali shilling) has endured in spite of decades of conflict, state failure and fragility and the absence of a central bank in Somalia. The currency has experienced continuing depreciation and declining use due to a conglomeration of factors; the dollarization of the markets, the increasing use of mobile e-money and an influx of counterfeit money. The surprise recent rise in the exchange rate of Somali shilling to US dollar in Puntland, where it reached an all-time high of 46,000 SoSh per US dollar in November 2020, has caused concern among policy makers, businesspeople and the wider Somali public. SIDRA has conducted a research study in October – November 2020 to examine the available evidences on the causes of the current sharp decline of the value of the Somali shilling in Puntland, sings of inflation and the effects of this depreciation on the poor and low-income families, the State and the wider public. The study explored the underlying fiscal and monetary problems of the Somali shilling depreciation and briefly summarizes the difficulties faced by the monetary institutions such as the Central Bank of Somalia and Puntland State Bank to stabilise the local currency. The turbulent relationship and disagreements between the FGS and FMS over a raft of issues have eclipsed many important debates on peace and state building such as currency reforms. This study brings the debate over a new Somali currency to the fore and poses the question whether “the Somali shilling can withstand the multidimensional onslaught on its acceptability and value this time round?”

Somali women have always played an integral part in the economic and trade development of the country. Following the collapse of the central state, the majority of women became the breadwinners for their families through business. The Somali Federal Government must ensure the enforcement of laws and policies enabling women’s equal participation in the economy and the business development of the country through the establishment of an inter-agency platform for inclusive business in Somalia.

The key elements of effective citizen engagement are civic education, institutional capacity, enabling environment and agreed framework for dialogue and a link – whether it is an established institution or some other form of formal liaison between the citizens and their local government. SIDRA conducted this study to seek understanding of the level of citizen engagement in Puntland local governance and the intertwined role and effects of decentralization, democratization and citizen engagement.

Radicalisation is undermining Somalia’s peace, stability and development prospects. Religious extremism in the country has also become a security concern for the region and the world. Young, uneducated Somalis and their well-educated diaspora peers who grew up in affluence in the West have become foot soldiers and suicide bombers for Somalia’s extremist insurgency Al- Shabaab. This paper is informed by qualitative research in the form of interviews with key informants. In addition, desk research was conducted to complement the primary sources. In each of the seven major Somali cities, 10 key informant interviews and a single focus group discussion were conducted, producing a total data set comprising 70 individual interviews and seven focus group discussions. All respondents were asked to discuss the root causes of youth radicalisation in Somalia and suggest potential solutions.

SIDRA has conducted a short study on “the role of the education system in nurturing youth in leadership”. The study sought to highlight how the education system shapes the attitudes, knowledge, skills and competences of young people in leadership and examined the understanding of students in secondary education about leadership skills and characteristics. The policy brief reports the absence of youth leadership education in Somali education system and calls for discussion and debate on education reform to promote youth leadership in primary and secondary education. It presents practical recommendations for the development and integration of youth leadership education and leadership opportunities for young people in Somali education system.