SIDRA

Galkayo is a town in the Mudug region of central Somalia. It is a border town divided into northern and southern sections under the 1993 Mudug Peace Agreement. The city’s division dates back to the collapse of the Somali military government led by General Mohamed Siad Barre in 1991, which plunged the country into clan-based conflict. Today, North Galkayo is administered by Puntland, established in 1998, while South Galkayo is administered by Galmudug, established in 2006. During the civil war, Galkayo became one of Somalia’s major conflict hotspots, witnessing intense fighting between the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) and the Somali National Democratic Union (SNDU) on one side, and the United Somali Congress (USC) on the other. On 4 June 1993, SSDF leader Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, SNDU leader Ali Ismail Abdi-Giir, and USC Chairman General Mohamed Farah Aideed signed the Mudug Peace Agreement, ending major hostilities in the region and establishing a framework for coexistence that has continued to shape Galkayo’s political and administrative landscape. Following the Mudug Peace Agreement, Galkayo experienced nearly two decades of relative stability, with no major armed confrontations until November 2015, when fighting erupted between Puntland and Galmudug forces. The conflict, which continued until December 2015, left at least 20 people dead and more than 120 others injured. It also displaced over 90,000 residents (Heritage Institute, 2016). This highlights the city’s continued vulnerability to renewed violence despite years of relative peace. Similarly, less than a year later, Puntland and Galmudug were again engaged in deadly fighting in Galkayo in October 2016 over a disputed border area. The violence erupted on the outskirts of the city at the site of a livestock market under construction by the Puntland administration. Humanitarian agencies estimated that nearly 90,000 people were displaced by the conflict, while dozens of people, mainly from the warring parties, were killed (ReliefWeb, 2016). In December 2017, the leaders of Puntland and Galmudug reached a peace agreement facilitated by the Federal Government of Somalia and international partners (Goobjoog, 2017). The agreement established a ceasefire, promoted cooperation between the two administrations, facilitated the reopening of roads and commercial activities, and created mechanisms for dialogue and joint security coordination. In the years that followed, Puntland and Galmudug continued to strengthen cooperation to maintain stability in the Mudug region, particularly in Galkayo. Successive leaders from both administrations reaffirmed their commitment to implementing previously signed agreements through regular dialogue and confidence-building measures. In 2020, Puntland and Galmudug reached a new agreement to cooperate on security, institution-building, and economic development (Puntland Post, 2020). One of the most notable outcomes of this cooperation has been joint counterterrorism efforts, which have enabled the security authorities of both administrations to coordinate operations against common security threats. Against this backdrop, this policy brief examines recent security developments in Galkayo, assesses the potential risks associated with renewed tensions, and analyzes their implications for peace, civilian protection, and regional stability. It also identifies the key drivers of the current security dynamics and proposes evidence-based policy options to prevent further escalation, strengthen dialogue and security coordination, and preserve the hard-won stability achieved in Galkayo over the past decade.

The collapse of the military government led by Mohamed Siad Barre in 1991 triggered state breakdown and civil war across Somalia. In the north, the Somali National Movement (SNM) consolidated control over most of the former British Somaliland Protectorate. Following a series of reconciliation conferences involving SNM leaders, clan elders, and community representatives, the SNM Central Committee declared on 18 May 1991 the restoration of the Republic of Somaliland within the borders of the former British Protectorate (Interpeace, 2008). Over the following decades, Somaliland reduced inter-clan conflict, established hybrid governance combining traditional elders (Guurti) with modern institutions, and held multiple elections. A 2001 referendum reportedly showed overwhelming support for independence. Despite maintaining relative internal stability and functioning institutions, Somaliland has not received international recognition and continues to be regarded under international law as part of the Federal Republic of Somalia (Michael Walls and Steve Kibble, 2011). Somaliland grounds its territorial claim in the borders of the former British Protectorate, which briefly gained independence on 26 June 1960 before uniting with Italian-administered Somalia on 1 July 1960. However, its claim over the Sool and Sanaag regions has long been contested. In August 2023, SSC-Khatumo forces took control of Las Anod and surrounding areas, and in October 2023 the Federal Government recognised SSC-Khatumo as an interim administration (Horseed Media, 2023). In July 2025, a Grand Constitutional Conference declared the formation of the Northeastern State as Somalia’s sixth Federal Member State, with federal recognition granted on 31 July 2025 (CHS Doha, 2025). These developments have altered the territorial realities underlying Somaliland’s independence claim. In recent years, Somaliland has intensified its diplomatic and lobbying efforts to secure international recognition. In early 2025, international media reported that the United States and Israel had approached several East African actors, including Somaliland, as possible destinations for resettling Palestinians displaced from Gaza under proposals linked to the U.S. President Donald Trump’s post-war plan (AP, 2025). Reports also suggest that the United Arab Emirates, which normalized relations with Israel under the Abraham Accords, may have played a facilitating role. The UAE maintains strong economic ties with Somaliland, including a $442 million investment in the development and operation of the Berbera port (Bloomberg, 2026). Somaliland’s location along the Gulf of Aden, near the Bab al-Mandeb Strait and the sea route connecting the Red Sea to the Suez Canal, significantly enhances its geopolitical importance. This corridor carries a substantial share of global container traffic and energy shipments (World Bank, 2025). Its strategic position has attracted sustained interest from regional and international actors. In January 2024, Ethiopia and Somaliland signed a Memorandum of Understanding under which Ethiopia would gain access to the Red Sea through Berbera in exchange for potentially recognising Somaliland as an independent state (BBC, 2024). Although the agreement was not formalised, it intensified regional tensions. On 26 December 2025, Israel formally recognised Somaliland as an independent state under the framework of the Abraham Accords (BBC, 2025). Somalia’s Federal Government strongly condemned the decision, describing it as a violation of its sovereignty and warning against any foreign military presence on its territory (AlJazeera, 2025). This recognition marked the first time a UN member state formally acknowledged Somaliland’s independence, transforming a long-standing political dispute into a major international diplomatic and security concern. Against this backdrop, this policy brief analyses the political, legal, security, and diplomatic implications of Israel’s recognition of Somaliland for Somalia and the wider Horn of Africa. This study examines how this decision may affect Somalia’s sovereignty, regional stability, and international relations. This brief aims to inform policymakers, regional actors, and international partners about the associated risks and support evidence-based responses that uphold Somalia’s unity, constitutional order, and long-term stability.

Digital technologies and internet connectivity continue to reshape social and economic systems worldwide. For households, improved access to timely information and reduced transaction costs help strengthen learning outcomes, support more active labor-market participation, and raise income and overall welfare. For businesses, digital tools are becoming integral to decision-making, operational efficiency, innovation, and the ability to reach a broader market (World Bank, 2024). Africa is experiencing a rapid digital transformation. Despite ongoing challenges related to infrastructure, connectivity, and service reliability, Internet adoption continues to rise across the continent. Between 2019 and 2022, more than 160 million people became regular users of cyberspace, highlighting the growing dependence on digital platforms for communication, commerce, education, and governance (World Bank, 2024). This expansion is reshaping how communities connect and access opportunities, even as digital inclusion remains uneven across regions. Despite the rapid expansion of the digital age, this transformation has also introduced significant risks, most notably the rising threat of cybercrime. As technological innovation accelerates, cybercriminals have adapted in parallel, using increasingly sophisticated methods to exploit digital vulnerabilities. These developments pose serious risks to individuals, organizations, and national security. The impacts extend well beyond financial losses, often resulting in considerable psychological and emotional distress for victims (Interpol, 2024). In 2024, the cybersecurity landscape was shaped by rising geopolitical tensions, rapid AI adoption, and increasing vulnerabilities across global supply chains, according to the Global Cybersecurity Outlook 2025 (World Economic Forum, 2025). Organizations faced mounting pressure as regulatory environments became more fragmented and cybercrime, particularly AI enhanced ransomware, grew more sophisticated. More than 15 million cybercrime incidents were recorded globally in 2024, a slight decrease from the previous year. The highest level was in 2021, with 19.23 million incidents (Statista, 2025). In 2023, nearly 10 million devices were infected with data-stealing malware, each exposing an average of 51 login credentials. Cybercriminals used these stolen credentials to enable further attacks or traded them across dark-web forums and private Telegram channels (Kaspersky, 2024). Africa is among the regions that have faced the highest number of cyberattacks in recent years. The 2023 assessment points to a sharp rise in such incidents, underscoring the continent’s growing exposure to digital threats (Interpol, 2024). According to the report, the average number of weekly cyberattacks per organization increased by 23% from the previous year, marking the highest global growth rate. Although the report does not provide a consolidated total of incidents, it highlights that both the frequency and impact of cybercrime continue to escalate. Importantly, cyber-dependent and cyber-enabled crimes are now classified as medium to high-risk threats in more than two-thirds of surveyed countries, revealing widespread vulnerability across Africa’s digital landscape. While the global community has witnessed significant technological advancements over the past three decades, Somalia has also grappled with prolonged conflict and instability, conditions that have constrained its ability to benefit from digital progress fully. Even so, notable gains have been made, particularly in telecommunications and digital financial services (World Bank, 2024). Somalia’s cybersecurity vulnerabilities stem from weak legal enforcement, limited technical infrastructure, a shortage of skilled personnel, and the absence of coordinated national mechanisms for threat detection and response. Together, these factors create a fragile digital environment highly susceptible to cyber risks, underscoring the urgent need for sustained capacity-building and strategic planning. Somalia currently faces a significant gap in its cybersecurity architecture, as there is no clearly defined national strategy to prevent or respond to large-scale cyberattacks. Although the cabinet has approved a new cybersecurity bill, it has not yet been ratified by parliament (SONNA, 2025). The country ranks among the top 20 globally in terms of the number of computers infected with malware, underscoring the severity of the threat. The absence of a coordinated cybersecurity system also means there is no reliable mechanism for tracing the origin of attacks. Over the past decade, cyber incidents in Somalia have frequently involved the hacking of email accounts, personal computers, and web applications, exposing both individuals and institutions to persistent digital vulnerabilities (Nur, Abas Osman, 2021). This policy brief examines Somalia’s digital development, the emerging cybersecurity challenges, the current response efforts, and future opportunities, and concludes with actionable policy recommendations.

This policy brief advocates for the introduction of Conscious Discipline, a trauma-informed, relationship-based approach to behaviour and learning to improve educational outcomes in Somalia. The current reliance on punitive discipline, coupled with high rates of poverty, food insecurity, and trauma, has left millions of children either out of school or unable to learn effectively. Data from UNICEF, the World Bank, and Somali authorities confirm that school attendance, quality of instruction, and emotional safety remain critically low. Conscious Discipline offers a locally adaptable alternative that focuses on building emotional security, connection, and self-regulation in children. The brief outlines recommendations for integrating this approach into national education policy, teacher training, and community engagement. It concludes that creating emotionally safe learning environments is not a luxury but necessary for Somalia to build an inclusive, resilient, and effective education system. Key Findings

On January 20, 2025, US President Donald Trump issued an Executive Order (EO) mandating a 90-day suspension of U.S.-funded foreign aid, including humanitarian operations, with the stated aim of evaluating the alignment of US foreign development assistance with the administration’s foreign policy priorities (White House, 2025). On January 24, 2025, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the agency responsible for distributing civilian foreign aid on behalf of the US government, announced to all its global partners a pause on all new funding obligations and sub-obligations under Development Objective Agreements (DOAGs) (USAID, 2025) The United States is the world’s largest donor of international aid. Established in 1961, USAID serves as the US government’s primary agency for funding international development and humanitarian assistance and is globally recognized for its leadership in delivering growth and humanitarian aid (FY 2024 International Affairs Budget, n.d.). Several government agencies are involved in US foreign assistance, with USAID accounting for approximately 60% of the total, followed by the Department of State, which manages nearly 30% (Brookings, 2024). In fiscal year 2024, the United States allocated $54 billion in global assistance, supporting various international programs. Of this amount, $13 billion was explicitly directed to sub-Saharan Africa, addressing critical needs such as humanitarian aid, economic development, and infrastructure projects. Additionally, a significant portion of the remaining funds was invested in global programs, including health initiatives to combat diseases and improve medical access and climate-related efforts crucial for achieving environmental protection and sustainability. Africa has become a primary beneficiary of these broader programs, receiving substantial support to enhance resilience and development (Foreign Assistance, 2024). The suspension of US Government funding, particularly through USAID, caused widespread disruption in ongoing and planned humanitarian programs, such as health and nutrition programs, which are critical for the health, welfare, and livelihoods of vulnerable communities worldwide. The disruption has affected millions of people, particularly in vulnerable and crisis-affected regions in the world, by cutting off essential services such as HIV treatment, tuberculosis care, and food aid (New York Times, 2025). Africa has been significantly impacted by the suspension of USAID funding, where many countries depend heavily on USAID for essential programs, with healthcare being the most significant component of US aid to Africa (ISSAfrica, 2025). Somalia, a Horn of Africa nation facing challenges such as conflict, drought, and economic instability, relies heavily on aid. USAID funding has been a crucial lifeline, supporting essential areas such as food security, healthcare, education, and governance. The United States has provided nearly $2.3 billion for humanitarian assistance in Somalia since Fiscal Year 2022, supporting programs ranging from emergency nutrition and sanitation projects to education, skills, and livelihood programs (Reliefweb, 2024). In 2025, Somalia was set to receive $125 million in USAID funding for similar programs (AP, 2025). A recent survey by the Somali NGO Consortium on the impact of the US aid suspension in Somalia revealed significant disruptions to humanitarian efforts. Hundreds of NGO staff have been affected, and millions have been left without essential services. According to the survey, over 60% of NGOs operating in Somalia counted on USAID as their leading donor to address humanitarian needs. Approximately 70% of national and international NGOs in Somalia receive funding from the Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance (BHA) and USAID, with more than half receiving stop-work orders, including those with indirect funding. The most affected sectors are health, nutrition, WASH, food security, education, and protection. Over 10,000 beneficiaries have been directly impacted, with one organization reporting disruptions affecting over 1.6 million people. Staff layoffs and unpaid leave have become common, leaving many NGOs in a state of uncertainty (Somali NGO Consortium, 2025). SIDRA Institute has produced this policy brief against the backdrop of the omnipresent concern about the US funding freeze to highlight its effects on the delivery of essential services for vulnerable communities, the impact on NGO staff and employment, disruptions to economic development, and the broader implications of the sudden withdrawal of assistance in the context of aid dependency.

Somalia remains one of the few countries in the world that has not yet established a National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), highlighting a critical institutional void compared to its regional peers, all of whom have made progress in institutionalizing human rights protection. Historically, Somalia has lacked a stable and effective framework for human rights protection. From colonial-era repression and post-independence authoritarianism to the state collapse between 1991 and 2012, the country has endured prolonged periods of systemic human rights violations. Even today, weak institutions, insecurity, and legal enforcement challenges persist. Conversely, Somalia has shown commitment to international human rights by ratifying six (6) core human rights treaties and one Optional Protocol, allowing individuals to submit complaints to the UN Human Rights Committee. In addition to these core treaties, Somalia has also ratified one of the Optional Protocols to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which allows individuals within Somalia to complain to the United Nations Human Rights Committee if they believe their rights have been violated. As of 2025, Somalia has had an Independent Expert appointed by the United Nations to monitor and report on its human rights situation for over 32 consecutive years since the establishment of the mandate in 1993 by the former UN Commission on Human Rights. This makes it one of the longest-standing UN country-specific human rights mandates worldwide. This policy brief analyzes the legal and procedural concerns surrounding the use of a written examination in selecting candidates for Somalia’s Independent National Human Rights Commission a method that significantly differs from the selection processes used for other national bodies like the electoral and anti-corruption commissions. The brief draws on Somalia’s Provisional Constitution, the 2016 Human Rights Commission Law, the 1993 Paris Principles, GANHRI guidelines, and comparative constitutional practices from East African Community states.  It concludes that the introduction of procedures not grounded in law such as written tests could undermine the commission’s credibility, potentially exclude competent applicants, and weaken the inclusive, merit-based standards essential for national human rights institutions. The brief recommends stronger legal clarity and closer alignment with national and international standards in the appointment process.