Opinion

Africa’s think tank community is operating in a changing environment. Funding is becoming more uncertain, political pressures are affecting the space in which policy research is conducted, and new technologies, particularly artificial intelligence, are changing how research and communication are produced. The On Think Tanks State of the Sector Report 2026 offers an interesting picture of this transition. Based on responses from 299 think tanks in 94 countries, the report looks at how organisations are responding to changes in funding, political pressure and technology. For Africa, the findings are particularly relevant because many think tanks continue to depend heavily on international and project-based funding. Funding is becoming a question of sustainability The funding environment remains one of the biggest concerns for think tanks globally. The report finds that 63.5% of organisations identified lack of funding as a challenge during the previous 12 months, while 67.9% expect it to remain a challenge over the next year. At the same time, 36.5% reported an actual decline in funding. For sub-Saharan Africa, however, the picture is more nuanced. The report records that 46% of African organisations surveyed reported an increase in funding, making sub Saharan Africa the region where reported increases were higher than reported declines. This should not be interpreted as evidence that the funding problem has disappeared. The report itself cautions that these regional differences are descriptive and not statistically significant. The bigger issue for African think tanks is the structure of funding. Sub Saharan African think tanks are highly dependent on project grants. Ninety percent of organisations in the regional sample reported using project grants. The region also has the highest level of international funding exposure in the report, with 83.3% receiving international funding. At the same time, African organisations make use of other sources, including consulting, services, membership fees and investments or rent. This matters because project funding can make it difficult for organisations to plan beyond individual projects, invest in staff and build financial reserves. Across the sector, only 12% of organisations said covering indirect costs was easy or very easy, while about two in five had less than three months of operating reserves or no reserves at all. For many African think tanks, therefore, the question is not simply “How much funding is available?” It is also “What kind of funding is available?” Longer term and more flexible support can give institutions room to develop research agendas, retain staff and respond to emerging policy questions rather than constantly moving from one short term project to another. Political pressure is part of the operating environment Funding is only one part of the challenge. The report finds that a difficult political context was reported by just over four in ten think tanks globally. Importantly, this challenge is not limited to countries where civic space is formally restricted. It appears across different civic space environments. In sub Saharan Africa, 42.9% of organisations reported a difficult political context as a challenge during the previous year. This places political context among the significant pressures affecting the sector. The nature of that pressure can vary from country to country. In more restricted environments, the report points to regulation as a major constraint, including registration requirements, foreign funding rules and reporting obligations. Government distrust of think tanks also becomes more prominent in some restricted civic spaces. For African research organisations, maintaining credibility and independence therefore requires more than producing good research. It also requires building relationships, communicating evidence carefully and understanding the political and institutional environment in which research is used. This is particularly important at a time when evidence itself can become contested. A think tank may produce a technically strong study, but its influence depends partly on whether policymakers, journalists, civil society and the public are willing to engage with the evidence. The skills challenge is also a major concern There is another pressure that receives less attention than funding: people. The report identifies skilled staff shortages as the second most frequently reported challenge after funding. In sub Saharan Africa, 56% of organisations reported a shortage of skilled staff. African think tanks also identified a relatively broad range of areas where they need stronger capacity. Fundraising was the most frequently identified priority, at 84%, followed by communication and marketing at 70%, strategic planning at 66%, innovation and adaptability at 72%, and research capacity at 58%. This tells an important story. The future of African think tanks is not only about finding more money. It is also about developing institutions capable of using available resources effectively. Research skills remain important, but so are communication, fundraising, digital tools, organisational management and the ability to translate research into forms that different audiences can understand. AI is changing the equation Perhaps the most striking development in the report is the speed at which artificial intelligence has entered the think tank sector. Globally, 83.9% of think tanks reported using AI in their work in 2026, compared with 71% in 2025 and 57% in 2024. The report describes AI as a “leveller” because adoption is now widespread across different organisational sizes, regions and income groups. The change is particularly visible in Africa. AI adoption among sub Saharan African think tanks increased from 56.8% in 2025 to 84% in 2026. This is one of the clearest examples in the report of how quickly African organisations are adapting to technological change. The technology is being used mainly for practical tasks. Across the sector, communications and research are the two most common areas of AI use. Grammar and writing assistants are the most widely used tools, followed by meeting and note taking assistants. In sub Saharan Africa, 70% of organisations reported using grammar and writing tools, 68% used note taking or meeting assistants, and 50% used chatbots. This is important because AI is no longer simply a conversation about the future. For many African think tanks, it is already part of everyday organisational work. But adoption also creates new questions. How should organisations disclose the use of AI? What should

Somalia’s piracy attacks surged between 2005 and 2011, during which pirates earned millions in ransom payments. At the peak of piracy, it is estimated that more than $400 million was paid in ransoms for pirate activities. During this period, pirates primarily targeted foreign vessels, seizing cargo and crews and holding them hostage to negotiate ransom payments. However, recent attacks have expanded to target a wider range of vessels, including those carrying shipments belonging to Somali businesspeople. The international community mobilized to combat the surge in piracy off the Horn of Africa. More than 40 countries participated in military counter-piracy operations, either independently or through three major coalitions: the European Union Naval Force Somalia through Operation Atalanta, NATO’s Standing Naval Group through Operation Ocean Shield, and Combined Task Force 151. These coordinated efforts significantly reduced piracy attacks, particularly between 2012 and 2016. As a result, NATO formally ended Operation Ocean Shield off the coast of Somalia in December 2016. The European Union Operation Atalanta still exists, but its role has shifted toward monitoring and support instead of continuous combat operations. International efforts were not the only factor in reducing piracy. Locally led initiatives, particularly by the Puntland Maritime Police Force, a UAE supported force, also played a critical role. These efforts focused on disrupting pirate networks on land and preventing attacks before they could be launched. The reasons behind the slow resurgence of piracy The recent, gradual resurgence of piracy in Somalia is believed to be driven by a combination of factors. One key factor is the decline in international attention, as several counter-piracy operations have ended or scaled down. At the same time, local forces such as the Puntland Maritime Police Force have shifted focus. For example, in the past year, its resources were redirected toward operations against ISIS militants in the Al Miskaat mountain range. Beyond changes in security efforts, the resurgence is also driven by persistent root causes. Economic hardship in Puntland, where the latest hijackings have occurred, particularly in coastal communities dependent on fishing, has pushed some individuals toward piracy as a survival strategy. These challenges have been exacerbated by droughts, declining fish stocks, and broader economic shocks. Illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing by foreign vessels further depletes local fish stocks, undermining the livelihoods of fishermen and increasing incentives for piracy. Somalia is estimated to lose around 300 million US dollars annually to such fishing across its vast maritime territory, which includes Africa’s longest coastline, approximately 3,333 km along the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden. These ongoing violations are sometimes used to justify pirate attacks. A 2024 study by the SIDRA Institute found that in some communities, piracy has gained a degree of social acceptance. It is occasionally viewed as a form of coast guarding against foreign exploitation. Additionally, the influx of ransom money can create local economic dependence, further reinforcing and sustaining piracy activities. The study also highlights that even when piracy incidents decline, the underlying infrastructure, including networks, financing mechanisms, and operational skills, remains intact. This allows piracy to quickly re-emerge when conditions become favorable. It is also important to note that there are differences between the pirates of 2005 to 2012 and those operating today. Earlier pirate groups relied mainly on basic tools such as mobile phones. In contrast, modern pirates have access to more advanced technologies, including online ship tracking platforms that provide real-time information on vessel locations, routes, and cargo. This enables them to plan and execute more sophisticated and targeted attacks. Abdi Omar Bile is a researcher at the Somali Institute for Development Research and Analysis (SIDRA) in Puntland, Somalia, with more than 15 years of experience in journalism and media practice. His research interests include media, technology, governance, security, environmental reporting, and public policy. Over the course of his career, he has worked with both local and international media organisations, reporting extensively on political developments, climate change, security issues, and social challenges affecting communities in Somalia. He holds a Master’s degree in Journalism and Mass Communication.

Introduction Somalia is grappling with political and constitutional crises of monumental proportions that is threatening institutional collapse. The constitutional review process has ground to a halt as political squabbles continue to dog the federal system that has become inherently dysfunctional. With just over a year left before the expiration of the mandates of the current Federal Government, and Parliament, Somalia remains at a crossroads due to a paralysis in governance as violent conflicts rage across the country. According to Amanda Frost, a Law Professor at the University of Virginia, a constitutional crisis occurs “when one branch of government, usually the executive, “blatantly, flagrantly and regularly exceeds its constitutional authority — and the other branches are either unable or unwilling to stop it. ¹” The crisis in governance is compounded by the deteriorating security situation and lack of a negotiated settlement that can deliver Somalia from ongoing political doldrums, anarchy and lawlessness.  Conceptual Analyses To better understand Somalia’s ongoing quagmire, presenting in-depth conceptual analyses of the unresolved constitutional crisis can shed light on the current impasse. Relevant theoretical frameworks include the constitutional theory, conflict theory and negotiation theory. Constitutional Theory German Philosopher Emmanuel Kant, is credited with formulating ideas that laid the foundation of the constitutional theory of the twentieth century. A distinctive feature of the Kantian theory is the emphasis on the supremacy of a country’s written constitution arguing that the exercise of government power must be constrained by the law and guided by a social contract as a regulative matter². This doctrine further posits that the “power of the state must be limited in order to protect the citizens from the arbitrary exercise of authority. While the theory supports the ideals for building a universal and permanent peaceful life, its basic premise underlines the necessity for the creation of the most just and fair organization of people’s life under the aegis of the law.” ³ __________________________________________________________________________________________________ ¹ NPR: https://www.npr.org/2025/02/11/1230674436/are-we-in-a-constitutional-crisis ² Immanuel Kant, History of Political Philosophy, edited by Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey, University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1987 ³ ibid Based on the above theory, Somalia’s constitutional crisis will remain unresolved unless the recurrent abuse of power by the Executive as well as attempts to mutilate and manipulate the constitution to suit particular political interests at the expense of the national agenda is checked and the necessary safeguards put in place to protect the country’s constitutional gains.  As per the constitutional theory, “the necessity for the creation of the most just and fair organization of people’s life under the aegis of the law” is inherently lacking in Somalia while the quest to build a universal and permanent peaceful life is undermined by Villa Somalia’s rule by decree virtually usurping the powers of the judiciary and legislature and undercutting the independence of the public bureaucracy. The ruling class and all concerned stakeholders must uphold the doctrine of the supremacy of the constitution as the fundamental and paramount law of the land to which the country shall duly be governed. Under this doctrine, if a newly enacted law or contract violates any provisions in the constitution whether in part or whole and whether promulgated by legislative or executive powers, such an enactment shall be deemed as null and void and without any effect or force. Constitutional actors and office holders must adhere to and advance the principles and practices that underpin the constitutional order while conforming to established norms for resolving contested constitutional matters. Conflict Theory Somalia is a country embroiled in a protracted conflict that has overtime, unleashed the dark forces of clannism, warlordism, terrorism and state violence. At the conceptual level, conflict theories assume that all societies have structural power divisions and resource inequalities that lead to groups having conflicting interests. While Karl Marx emphasized class conflict (the bourgeoisie vs. proletariat) over economic resources, Max Weber suggested that conflict and inequality can be caused by power and status independently of class structures. ⁴ The Marxist definition technically applies to industrialized countries where society is organized along two major classes, the bourgeoisie, erstwhile regarded as the owners of means of production and the proletariat, the exploited working class whose labour is the primary source of capital accumulation, wealth and profit for the ruling class. Some conflict analysts argue that the Weberian premise that explores factors beyond class can better explain the myriads of conflicts in non-industrialized countries, Somalia included. Scholars like Alex De Waal have rejected the notion that Somalia has fractured along clan lines, because of the inherent incapacity of the clan system of politics to provide the basis for a modern state. De Waal argues that even in a country without a functioning government and formal economy, control over productive resources and the means of trade are the core to the political economy⁵. __________________________________________________________________________________________ ⁴ What is Conflict Theory: https://www.simplypsychology.org/conflict-theory.html He highlights the nature of the resource-driven Somali conflict that is rooted in riverine agricultural land, pastureland, remittances from overseas workers and the resources that can be captured and dispensed by a sovereign state, including foreign aid and currency (“sovereign rents”). Further, De Waal has developed a class analysis of the origins and development of the crisis, locating it in “the growth of state-mediated capitalist relations in both agriculture and pastoralism, and the key role that control of the state apparatus played in allowing capital accumulation among certain sections of the mercantile class in the 1980’s⁶.” More importantly, De Waal points to the “legacy of disputed ownership of real estate and agricultural land as one key element in the enduring crisis”, adding “the expectation that a future government will be able to bestow the same benefits on its favoured businessmen is a key element in sharpening the ongoing struggle in southern Somalia.⁷” In finding a lasting resolution, both the class and clan dynamics of the Somali conflict as well as the rent seeking by state and private sector actors must be addressed. As a step forward, peacebuilders and mediators need to acknowledge the often